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Abstract
In their seminal paper, Harrington and Hess (1996) discuss a model where
candidates diﬀer along two dimensions - ideology which is modeled by the
standard Hotelling-Downs formulation and valence factors which encompass
traits which all voters agree as desirable. While valence factor is given, the
voter perception of a candidate’s ideology can be inﬂuenced via advertising. In
this expository note, we extend the model model to take account of valence
as well as ideological advertising but we restrict our attention only to negative
advertising. We ﬁnd that when the available resources are suﬃciently small
and certain technical conditions are fulﬁlled, the expected result holds, namely,
the candidate with the higher initial valence index will run a relatively personal
campaign while the candidate with the lower initial valence index will run an
ideological campaign.
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11 Introduction
Negative campaign advertising has been an integral part of American political cam-
paigns over the last ﬁfty years. While it has received a lot of attention among jour-
nalists, political scientists and in communication studies and there have been both
experimental and empirical studies on the topic (see Ansolabehere et al. (1994),
Wattenburg and Brians (1999)), there has been relatively meagre formal modelling
on this topic.
In their seminal paper, Harrington and Hess (1996) discuss a model of two-
candidate electoral competition where candidates diﬀer along two dimensions - ide-
ology and personal attributes or valence factors where the latter encompass traits
which all voters agree as desirable. Kinder (1988) identiﬁes them as leadership,
integrity, competence and empathy. Ideology is modelled via the Hotelling-Downs
spatial model. At the beginning of the race, candidates inherit a certain valence
index and a certain voter perception of their ideologies. They can subsequently in-
ﬂuence these by allocating a certain amount of resources across positive and negative
ideological advertising. Positive ideological advertising relocates a candidate’s ideol-
ogy towards the swing voter or marginal voter (i.e., the voter indiﬀerent between the
two candidates) while negative ideological advertising shifts the opponent’s ideology
away from the marginal voter. They ﬁnd that the candidate with the higher initial
valence factor will run a relatively positive campaign while the candidate with the
lower initial valence factor will run a negative campaign.
It is important to note that in their model, there is a complete absence of valence
advertising. This is acknowledged by the authors themselves, namely, “an equally im-
portant component of negative campaigning is with respect to the opponent’s personal
attributes. The history of campaigning is replete with denigration of the character
of one’s opponent. One should not infer from the absence in our model of negative
campaigning with respect to personal attributes that we believe such campaigning is
unimportant ... an interesting topic of future research would be to extend our model
to incorporate both types of campaigning." (Harrington and Hess, 1996).
In this expository note, we extend the Harrington and Hess (1996) model to
incorporate both types of campaigning - namely, campaigning on valence as well as
policy issues but we restrict our attention only to negative advertising. Ideological
2advertising moves the opponent’s ideology away from the marginal voter (or the voter
indiﬀerent between the two candidates) while valence advertising reduces the valence
index of the opponent. Our principal ﬁnding is that, under certain restrictions, the
expected result will hold, namely the candidate with the higher initial valence index
will run a relatively personal campaign while the candidate with the lower initial
valence index will run an ideological campaign. The goal of the note is fairly modest,
namely to elaborate on some mathematical aspects of a seminal model of political
advertising. We are agnostic about the relevance or usefulness of this model. Those
issues can only be settled by empirical testing. We will subsequently proceed as
follows. In section 2, we discuss the assumptions. In section 3, we discuss the results.
In section 4, we conclude.
2 Assumptions
We consider a two candidate model of electoral competition. Candidates are perceived
as diﬀering in terms of both their ideology and personal traits. A candidates ideology
is represented by a certain location on the ideology space represented by the [0,1]
interval. Personal traits are measured by a valence index which lies in [0,∞). We
use the Enlow and Hinich (1982) formulation where the utility of a voter located at
y from candidate i, i =1 ,2 is speciﬁed to be1
U(y,i)=αi − V (|y − xi|). (1)
where V : R+ → R+. Voters are uniformly distributed with density 1 along the [0,1]
interval.
Candidates inherit a certain ideological position x0
i and a certain valence index
α0
i. Without loss of generality we assume α0
1 >α 0
2 and x0
1 <x 0
2, namely candidate 1
is to the left of candidate 2 and has a higher valence index as well.
Candidates can inﬂuence voter perception using advertising. In this model, we
restrict ourselves to negative advertising and assume each candidate is endowed with
an equal amount of advertising resources A. The candidate can allocate his adver-
tising resources in two ways: ideological advertising which inﬂuence the perception
1Or rather a voter whose most favoured ideological position is located at y.
3of the opponent’s ideology and valence advertising which inﬂuences the perception of
the opponent’s valence index.
Let Ii be the amount of ideological advertising and Vi be the amount of valence
advertising of candidate i. Then a candidate’s ideological and valence advertising are
subject to the following constraints:
Ii + Vi 6 A;
Ii > 0;
Vi > 0.
Then the impact of candidates’ campaigns on voter perception of their ideology and
valence index is modelled through the post-advertising ideology and valence index as
follows;
x1 = x
0
1 − g(I2);
x2 = x
0
2 + g(I1);
α1 = α
0
1 − h(V2);
α2 = α
0
2 − h(V1);
where h : R+ → R+ and g : R+ → R+ model the impact of advertising on valence
index and ideology. A marginal voter is a voter who is indiﬀerent between the two
candidates. Negative ideological advertising moves the opponent away from the mar-
ginal voter. Negative valence advertising simply reduces the valence index of the
opponent. We make two key assumptions:
Assumption1: V
0 > 0,V
00 > 0,h
0 > 0,V (0) = 0,
h
00 < 0,g
0 > 0,g
00 < 0,h (0) = 0,g (0) = 0.
Assumption 2 : V (x
0
2 − x
0
1) − h(A) >α
0
1 − α
0
2 >h (A) > 0.
Assumption 1 implies that the advertising technology is concave and the distance
function is convex. There are many examples of advertising technology that ﬁtt h i s
speciﬁcation. One of them is given in Appendix 1. Assumption 2 ensures the existence
of a marginal voter (see lemma 1) and hence an interior solution by assuming that
4the amount available for advertising is suﬃciently small. If advertising expenditures
are large enough that the post-advertising valence proﬁles are reversed, the results
may not hold.
Each candidate is interested in maximizing his or her vote share. Hence, all
resources available for advertising will be fully expended. We will solve for the Nash
equilibrium (V ∗
1 ,V∗
2 ),w h e r eV ∗
i is the amount of valence advertising that maximizes
the vote share of candidate i,a n dI∗
i = A − V ∗
i .
3R e s u l t s
In this section, we will show our main result, namely that the candidate with the
higher valence factor conducts a campaign based on valence issues while a candidate
with a lower valence factor conducts a largely ideological campaign, namely in the
Nash equilibrium (V ∗
1 ,V∗
2 ), V ∗
1 > V ∗
2 which automatically implies I∗
1 6 I∗
2.T h ep r o o f s
have technical similarities with Harrington and Hess (1996). If the marginal voter
exists, his or her position is given by z(x1,x 2,α 1,α 2) obtained by solving:
α1 − V (z − x1)=α2 − V (x2 − z). (2)
It is intuitively obvious from the standard Hotelling-Downs model that if a marginal
voter exists, then all voters y ∈ [0,z) vote for candidate 1 and all voters y ∈ (z,1] vote
for candidate 2. In Lemma 1, we show this rigorously as well as prove the existence
of the marginal voter.
Lemma 1 Under assumption 2, for all advertising levels, an unique marginal voter z
exists where z ∈ (x1,x 2) and voter y ∈ [0,z) votes for candidate 1 and voter y ∈ (z,1]
votes for candidate 2.
Proof. Let z be deﬁned implicitly by ψ(z)=0where ψ(y) is the diﬀerence in utility
derived from candidate 1 and candidate 2 for voter y, namely,
ψ(y)=[ α1 − V (|y − x1|)] − [α2 − V (|y − x2|)].
Let us assume (we will show this later on) that
ψ(x1) > 0 >ψ (x2).
5Then by the intermediate value theorem, there exists z ∈ (x1,x 2) such that ψ(z)=0 .
Furthermore, since
ψ
0(y)=−V
0(|y − x1|) − V
0(|y − x2|) < 0
for all y ∈ (x1,x 2), z is unique. Also since ψ(z)=0and for y ∈ (x1,z), ψ
0(y) < 0,
therefore ψ(y) > 0 which implies U(y,1) >U(y,2).
For y<x 1,
ψ
0(y)=V
0(|y − x1|) − V
0(|y − x2|).
Since |y − x1| <x 1 − y<x 2 − y = |y − x2| and V 00 > 0,
V
0(|y − x1|) <V
0(|y − x2|)
which implies ψ
0(y) < 0. Now, ψ(x1) > 0 and ψ
0(y) < 0 for y<x 1 implies ψ(y) > 0
for y ∈ [0,x 1). Therefore, for y ∈ [0,x 1), U(y,1) >U (y,2). Hence, for y ∈ [0,z),
U(y,1) >U(y,2). Analogously, one can show that U(y,2) >U(y,1) for all y ∈ (z,1].
The ﬁnal step is to show that ψ(x1) > 0 >ψ (x2) is implied by assumption 2.
Now, ψ(x1) > 0 >ψ (x2) is equivalent to (given V1,V 2),
α
0
1 − α
0
2 >h (V2) − h(V1)+V (0) − V (x
0
2 − x
0
1 + g(I2)+g(I1)); (3)
α
0
1 − α
0
2 <h (V2) − h(V1) − V (0) + V (x
0
2 − x
0
1 + g(I2)+g(I1)). (4)
Consider (4). Since V (0) = 0, (4) can be written as
h(V2) − h(V1)+V (x
0
2 − x
0
1 + g(I2)+g(I1)) >α
0
1 − α
0
2. (5)
T h el e f th a n di si n c r e a s i n gi nV2,I 1 and I2 and decreasing in V1. Hence, (5) holds for
all advertising levels if it holds for (V1,V 2,I 1,I 2)=( A,0,0,0), namely if
−h(A)+V (x
0
2 − x
0
1) >α
0
1 − α
0
2
which is precisely assumption 2.
Next consider (3). Since V (0) = 0, (3) summarizes to
α
0
1 − α
0
2 >h (V2) − h(V1) − V (x
0
2 − x
0
1 + g(I2)+g(I1)).
The right hand side is increasing in V2 and decreasing in V1,I 1 and I2. Hence it holds
for all advertising levels if it holds for (V1,V 2,I 1,I 2)=( 0 ,A,0,0), namely if,
α
0
1 − α
0
2 >h (A) − V (x
0
2 − x
0
1).
6From assumption 2, h(A)−V (x0
2 −x0
1) < 0 and α0
1 −α0
2 > 0. Hence, the condition is
automatically satisﬁed. That completes the proof.
Next, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Assuming that the marginal voter exists and is located at z = z(x1,x 2,α 1,α 2).
Then
0 <
µ
∂z
∂α1
¶
µ
∂z
∂x1
¶ < −
µ
∂z
∂α2
¶
µ
∂z
∂x2
¶ (6)
Proof. First note that α1 >α 2 since α0
1 − α0
2 >h (A) from assumption 2. This is
because the lower bound of α1 is α0
1 − h(A) and the upper bound of α2 is α0
2. Hence
from equation (2), V (z −x1) >V(x2 −z). This implies z −x1 >x 2 −z since V 0 > 0.
Now, V 00 > 0 which implies V 0(z − x1) >V0(x2 − z) which implies
1
V 0(z − x1)
<
1
V 0(x2 − z)
. (7)
Partially diﬀerentiating (2) with respect to α and x1,w eg e t
∂z
∂α1
=
1
V 0(z − x1)+V 0(x2 − z)
;
∂z
∂x1
=
V 0(z − x1)
V 0(z − x1)+V 0(x2 − z)
.
Hence, µ
∂z
∂α1
¶
µ
∂z
∂x1
¶ =
1
V 0(z − x1)
. (8)
Similarly,
−
µ
∂z
∂α2
¶
µ
∂z
∂x2
¶ =
1
V 0(x2 − z)
. (9)
From (7), (8) and (9), (6) follows.
B e f o r ew ep r e s e n tt h en e x tl e m m a ,l e tu si n t r od u c es o m en o t a t i o n .F o rt h es t r a t e g y
tuple (V1,V 2), we get post-advertising locations and valence indices as functions of
7V1,V 2, namely if,
x1(V2)=x
0
1 − g(A − V2);
x2(V1)=x
0
2 + g(A − V1);
α1(V2)=α
0
1 − h(V2);
α2(V1)=α
0
2 − h(V1).
then the equilibrium location is given by z(x1,x 2) can be expressed as an indirect
function of V1 and V2. We denote this by
b z(V1,V 2)=z(x1(V2),x 2(V1),α 1(V2),α 2(V1))
= z(x
0
1 − g(A − V2),x
0
2 + g(A − V1),α
0
1 − h(V2),α
0
2 − h(V1)).
Now, we have our main result.
Lemma 3 Assuming that the marginal voter exists, V ∗
1 >V∗
2 .
Proof. For the Nash equilibrium (V ∗
1 ,V∗
2 ), the equilibrium location is represented
by b z(V ∗
1 ,V∗
2 ).N o w ,
∂b z
∂V1
=
∂z
∂α2
·
∂α2
∂V1
−
∂z
∂x2
·
∂x2
∂(A − V1)
= −
·
h
0(V1) ·
∂z
∂α2
+ g
0(A − V1) ·
∂z
∂x2
¸
. (10)
Similarly,
∂b z
∂V2
= −
·
h
0(V2) ·
∂z
∂α1
− g
0(A − V2) ·
∂z
∂x1
¸
. (11)
We can consider three alternative cases:
Case 1:L e t
∂b z(V ∗
1 ,V∗
2 )
∂V1
> 0.T h e nV ∗
1 = A which implies V ∗
1 > V ∗
2 .
Case 2:L e t
∂b z(V ∗
1 ,V∗
2 )
∂V2
> 0.T h e nV ∗
2 =0which implies V ∗
1 > V ∗
2 .
8Case 3:T h eﬁnal case is
∂b z(V ∗
1 ,V∗
2 )
∂V1
6 0 and
∂b z(V ∗
1 ,V∗
2 )
∂V2
6 0.T h e nf r o m( 1 0 )
and (11),
−
µ
∂z
∂α2
¶
µ
∂z
∂x2
¶ 6
g0(A − V ∗
1 )
h0(V ∗
1 )
; (12)
µ
∂z
∂α1
¶
µ
∂z
∂x1
¶ >
g0(A − V ∗
2 )
h0(V ∗
2 )
. (13)
From (6), (12) and (13),
g0(A − V ∗
1 )
h0(V ∗
1 )
>
g0(A − V ∗
2 )
h0(V ∗
2 )
. (14)
Now, suppose V ∗
2 > V ∗
1 . By concavity of g(.) and h(.),
h
0(V
∗
2 ) 6 h
0(V
∗
1 )
and
g
0(A − V
∗
2 ) > g
0(A − V
∗
1 )
which implies
g0(A − V ∗
1 )
h0(V ∗
1 )
6
g0(A − V ∗
2 )
h0(V ∗
2 )
which contradicts (14). Hence V ∗
1 >V∗
2 . That completes the proof.
Hence, we can show than under certain assumptions, candidates in a two-party
electoral contest tend to bet on their opponent’s weaknesses. Candidates with higher
valence factor tend to emphasize that their opponent is lacking on valence issues,
while the less likeable candidate tend to potray the other candidate as holding ex-
treme views. One pertinent issue is of course whether the assumptions are too re-
strictive. Concavity with regard to the impact of advertising expenditure is a fairly
reasonable assumption. After a certain amount of negative advertising, voters become
less sensitive to advertising. Assumption 2 simply implies that advertising does not
too large an eﬀect on the valence factor. Candidates can inﬂuence but not radically
alter voter perceptions with regard to valence issues. The other assumption here is
t h ec o n v e x i t yo ft h ed i s t a n c ef u n c t i o n . B u tc o n v e x i t yo ft h ed i s t a n c ef u n c t i o ns i m -
ply implies that as candidates are closer to each other, namely, their ideologies are
9less distinguishable, valence factor becomes more important in determining utility
obtained from a certain candidate. This in itself is a quite reasonable assumption.
4C o n c l u s i o n
In this note, we extend the model of Harrington and Hess (1996) in a direction sug-
gested by the authors by taking into account valence advertising. We ﬁnd that the
expected result holds under certain conditions - namely, the candidate with the lower
valence factor will divert more resources to ideological advertising and the candidate
with the higher valence factor will divert more resources to valence advertising. The
validity of this result depends on four central assumptions. First, advertising expen-
ditures are small enough so that they do not radically alter the voter perceptions of
the relative valence dimensions of the candidates. Second, the distance function is
convex. Third, the advertising technology is concave. Fourthly, near-complete ho-
mogeneity is assumed in the sense that both candidates are identical in all respects
other than their initial positions and initial valence indices.
If the above assumptions are relaxed then these results will no longer hold. In fact,
the very reverse result might hold, namely, the candidate with the lower valence factor
actually invests more in valence advertising. One may even end up in solutions where
both candidates invest all resources in valence advertising. With diﬀerent explicit
functional forms, diﬀerent solutions will result. There can, in fact, exist multiple
Nash equilibria. Some counter-examples are provided in Appendix 2.
10Appendix 1:
This example has been modiﬁed from Butters (1977). Consider a situation in
which candidates have one ad each for valence advertising and ideological advertising
but they can send out this ad several times in various media to N voters located
equidistant on a [0,1] space. The probability of a voter getting the ad each time it is
sent out is 1/N. If N is large, we have a reasonable approximation of the Hotelling-
Downs model. The probability of a voter getting an ad each time it is sent out is
1/N and the cost of sending the ad out each time is θ.
If the consumer receives the ad in question, it shifts the ideological position or
c h a n g e st h ev a l e n c ei n d e xo ft h eo p p o n e n tb yσ. However, if the same ad is received
more than once, there is no additional impact. This extreme case is meant to capture
the fact that the same ad if viewed more than once has a smaller and smaller additional
impact on voter perception.
We will show that h0 > 0 and h00 < 0 for valence advertising. Analogously, one
can show that the same holds for ideological advertising.
Given that Vi amount of resources are devoted to valence advertising by candidate
i, the number of valence ads sent out are equal to
Vi
θ
= ϑi (say).
The probability that x of these ads are received by a given consumer is equal to
Ã
ϑi
x
!µ
1
N
¶x µ
1 −
1
N
¶ϑi−x
.
The probability that a consumer receives zero ads is equal to
µ
1 −
1
N
¶ϑi
. In our
model, N tends to inﬁnity in which case the above expression can be approximated
by exp
µ
−
ϑi
N
¶
. Hence, the probability that a voter gets one or more ads is equal to
1 − exp
µ
−
ϑi
N
¶
.
Hence, expected change in the valence index of the opponent is equal to
σ
µ
1 − exp
µ
−
ϑi
N
¶¶
;
= σ
µ
1 − exp
µ
−
Vi
θ · N
¶¶
;
= h(Vi).
11Hence,
h
0(Vi)=
σ
θ · N
exp
µ
−
Vi
θ · N
¶
> 0;
h
00(Vi)=−
σ
θ
2 · N2 exp
µ
−
Vi
θ · N
¶
< 0.
Appendix 2:
Let V (k)=k, h(k)=k, g(k)=k for all k ∈ R+ namely, the system is fully
linear. Then the vote share is completely independent of how advertising expenses
are allocated between ideological and valence advertising. All possible allocations are
Nash equilibria subject to the constraint that all resources are spent and there are
an inﬁnite number of them.
If on the other hand, V (k)=k, h(k)=k2,g (k)=k2 for all k ∈ R+,t h e r ea r e
four Nash equilibria given by (V ∗
1 ,V∗
2 ) ∈ {(A,0),(0,A),(0,0),(A,A)}.
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